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JUSTICE IN THE UNIVERSITY:
LEGAL AVENUES FOR STUDENTS
CYNTHIA L. CHEWTERt

Universities have developed elaborate administrative procedures relating to
academic appeals and the discipline of students. When making decisions that
affect individual students, universities are accountable to the courts through
judicial review, actions in contract or tort, and under human rights legislation.
Inadequate attention to the procedural requirements of natural justice by
universities and undue deference by the courts to university autonomy have
rendered judicial review a poor and ineffective guarantor of natural justice.
An aggrieved student is advised to seek redress in the law of contract or
through human rights legislation. Procedural reform by universities and less
deference to these institutions on the part of the courts would better reflect
the important interest a student has in the completion of his or her education.

Les universites ont developpe des procedures administratives elaborees en
matiere d'appel academique et disciplinaire pour !es etudiants. Lorsque !es
universites prennent des decisions qui ajfectent !es droits des etudiants, elles
en sont responsables devant !es cours de justice sur la base du controle judicial
en dommages contractuels ou extra-contractuels et en vertu de la legislation
des droits de la personne. Une attention inadequate quant aux exigences
procedurales des regles de justice nature/le, ainsi qu 'une pratique de la
retenue judiciaire malencontrue par !es cours de justice envers !es universites,
font en sorte que le controle judicial clans le context universitaire est inejficace.
Un etudiant mecontent est avise de diriger sa requete en droit contractuel OU
en droits de la personne. Une riforme des procedures administratives des
universites ainsi qu 'un degre amoindri de retenue judiciaire a !'egard des
decisions de ces institutions rejleteront mieux !'importance des interets qu 'un
etudiant possede a completer ses etudes.

t Director, Dalhousie Student Advocacy Service; B .A. (Toronto), B .A. (McMaster), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie).
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Canadian universities have set up elaborate administrative schemes
in order to respect the rules of natural justice when making decisions
that affect individual students. Universities are held accountable for
these decisions in a number of ways, including judicial review, suits
in contract and tort, and through human rights legislation. To date
in Canada, little scholarly attention has been given to examining the
impact that the administrative decision-making structure of universities has on students. 1 Even less attention has been given to the
manner in which the courts have enforced the procedural guarantees
necessary to ensure that university decisions are made in accordance
with the principles of natural justice. This paper provides an
overview, a starting point for debate, as to whether, and how effectively, universities and the courts are giving effect to the requirements of procedural justice in relation to students. 2
Any assessment of the current system is directly dependent on
how one characterizes the interest a student has in his or her education. The universities and the courts tend to view post-secondary
education as a privilege and grant a level of natural justice commensurate with the removal of a privilege. This view undervalues the
student's interest in completing an education. An appropriate level
of procedural justice must recognize the serious and permanent consequences of expulsion and the great interest a student has in completing his or her education. If one accepts this estimation of a student's interest then there is every reason to be concerned with the status quo.
This paper will contend that inadequate protections at the university level and undue deference by the courts to university autonomy have created a system in which students can have little confidence. In Part I, the external and internal structure of universities is
examined, and an outline of the general regulatory powers vested in
universities is provided. Part II examines natural justice in the university context. It surveys both caselaw and the procedural guaran-

1 For an interesting, if dated, look at the legal nature of the university-student
relationship, see C. B. Lewis, "The Legal Nature of a University and the StudentUniversity Relationship" (1983) 15 Ottawa L.R. 249.
2 Quite a large body of caselaw and some literature exist on the requirements
of natural justice in a university's relations with its teaching staff. Because of the
specialized relationship of professors with universities, this body of law stands
apart from the law and procedures applicable to students; no attempt has been
made to compare the two here.
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tees currently in place in various Canadian universities.3 This section
concludes with an evaluation of the procedural fairness offered by
judicial review in the university context. The paper then turns, in
Parts III and IV, to other avenues of legal protection available to
students in either contracts and torts, or under human rights legislation. The final section contains recommendations for improving the
present situation.
I. THE ExTERNAL AND INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF
UNIVERSITIES

G. H. L. Fridman mused that universities are "curious bodies." 4 On
the one hand they are legal, self-governing corporations that enter
into contractual relations with faculty, staff, and students. Disputes
arising from these relations can be resolved in the courts in the same
way as any other contractual matter.
On the other hand, significant differences exist between the university and its corporate cousins. Universities are created through
legislative acts, are funded almost completely by the state, and
serve a public purpose: the education of the state's citizens.5 They
are also professional bodies, and their decisions to admit or to expel students give them a unique monopoly over the entrance to all
professions. Universities are public, statutory institutions subject to
judicial review by the courts on an administrative law basis, 6 and
like many administrative bodies, universities are perceived by the
3 The 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendars of the following nine universities
were selected: University of Alberta, University of British Columbia, Brock
University, McMaster University, Memorial University, Queen's University,
Saint Mary's University, University of Western Ontario, and York University.
The universities were selected at random, with the exception that an effort was
made to include the regulations of universities in several provinces and to
include regulations of larger and smaller institutions. For Dalhousie
University, the 1993-94 Dentistry, Law and Medicine Calendar was used. Because
the university has standardized procedures at Senate level, this would not affect
the results of the sample.
4 G. H. L. Fridman, "Judicial Intervention into University Affairs" (1973) 21
Chitty's L.J. 181 at 181.
5 For a thorough history and analysis of the role of the university in Canadian
society, see the dissent of Wilson, J. in McKinney v. Board of Governors of the
University of Guelph et al., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 at 320-417 [hereinafter
McKinney].
6 Fridman, supra note 4 at 181-182.
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courts as having considerable expertise. Courts have been especially
deferential when reviewing university decisions on matters concerning education and the granting of degrees.
A university is created by a public or private act of the legislature,? with varying degrees of detail as to how it is to be governed.s
An examination of the statutes that create Dalhousie University
serves to illustrate the governing structure of Canadian universities
in general. Dalhousie's statutes are a collection of private Acts
dating back to 1820.9 Currently, those Acts create a body corporate
to be known as Dalhousie College and University, at Halifax.
General regulation and control of the University is vested in a
Board of Governors having "all usual powers and authorities as
such."Io The members of the Board are either appointed by the
government of Nova Scotia, or elected from constituencies of
alumni, students, and others. 1 I As head of a body corporate, the
Board is the body that is capable of suing and being sued, of contracting with various parties, and of managing the finances of the
University.

7 Some univers1t1t1es are incorporated by Royal Charter, e.g. McGill
University in 1821.
8 Some statutes create only a broad general framework; others are "more or less
comprehensive attempts to regulate all aspects of university life." See for
example the Acts creating Dalhousie University S.N.S. 1863, c. 23 as amended;
and Saint Mary's University S.N.S. 1970, c. 147 as amended. Other provinces have
one statute which governs the incorporation of all universities within the
province. See e.g. the Universities Acts of British Columbia and Alberta. See
Lewis, supra note 1 at 249-251.
9 A Bill to Incorporate the Governors of the Dalhousie College, at Halifax, S.N.S.
1820, c. 39, repealed 1863. An Act for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie
College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24, as amended. An Act Relating to Dalhousie College and
University, S.N.S. 1967, c. 133, as amended. An Act to Amend Chapter 24 ofthe Acts
of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and Support ofDalhousie College, S.N.S. 1969, c.
127. An Act to Amend Chapter 24 ofthe Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and

Support ofDalhousie College and Chapter 104 ofthe Acts of 1935, An Act Relating to
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74. See Lewis, supra note 1at250.
IO An Act for the Regulation and Support ofDalhousie College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24,
s. l, as amended.
11 Dalhousie University, Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and
Medicine Calendar at 5. See also An Act for the Regulation and Support of
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1863, c. 24, s. 1.

JUSTICE IN THE UNIVERSITY

109

Internal regulation of the University is vested in the Senate, subject to approval by the Board. 12 The Act specifically gives the
Senate authority to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over students
and includes the power to fine, suspend, and expel. In addition, the
Senate is given authority to delegate these responsibilities to any
"person or body of persons," subject to those conditions it considers
proper. 13 The Senate determines its own composition under s. IA of
the Act, and currently consists of the President, Vice-Presidents,
Registrar, Deans of faculties, academic department heads, full professors, and elected members representing other faculty members
and students respectively. 14 The Senate (or committees thereof)
hears and decides cases at first instance as well as appeals from
lower levels. Avenues of appeal are deemed exhausted after the
adoption of a committee's decision by the Senate as a whole.
Therefore, it appears that the Board of Governors exercises its supervisory jurisdiction over the Senate only with regard to policy,
and not individual cases. 15
The President of the University is the Chief Executive Officer.
He or she derives authority from, and is responsible to, the Board of
Governors and the Senate for supervision of the university's administrative and academic work. In practice, the President of Dalhousie
University also assumes an ad hoc jurisdiction over non-academic
discipline at the university, a jurisdiction further delegated to the
Deans of the various faculties, who exercise it with the knowledge
and consent of the President on a case-by-case basis. 16
12 An Act to Amend Chapter 24 ofthe Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and
Support ofDalhousie College and Chapter 104 ofthe Acts of 1935, An Act Relating to
Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74, s. 2.
13 An Act to Amend Chapter 24 of the Acts of 1863, An Act for the Regulation and
Support ofDalhousie College, S.N.S. 1969, c. 127, s. 1(2); amending s. 7 of the Act
of 1863 by adding to its. 7(2).
14 Dalhousie University, Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and
Medicine Calendar at 5. See An Act to Amend Chapter 24 ofthe Acts of 1863, An Act
for the Regulation and Support of Dalhousie College and Chapter 104 of the Acts of
1935, An Act Relating to Dalhousie College, S.N.S. 1988, c. 74, s. 2.
l5 See e.g. Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals" [unpublished]; and Miraliakbari v.
Dalhousie College and University (1989), 39 Admin. L.R. 102 (N.S.S.C. T.D.).
l6 This delegation is not reflected in any formal policy of Dalhousie
University; an ad hoc Senate Committee has been struck to create a policy
regarding non-academic discipline, but has not yet reported to the Senate with
conclusions.
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Some universities' statutes also provide for a visitor. This is an
ancient institution in which an important figure, such as the
Lieutenant-Governor of the Province or the Bishop,17 is appointed to
oversee the internal matters of ecclesiastical, civil, or eleemosynary
corporations. 18 Where the office of the visitor exists, appeals by any
member of the university may be taken to him or her as a last resort.
The office of the visitor originated as an ecclesiastical institution for the purpose of supervising the government of the church, but
its connection to universities is equally venerable. 19 The visitor's
role in relation to a university is:
(a) to hear and adjudicate upon all claims and complaints
concerning the internal affairs of the corporation made by
the corporators, and (b) to appoint and remove the members and officers of the corporation. 20
Given "the antiquity of the office and the rarity of its exercise,"21 the powers of a visitor and the procedures under which he or
she operates are unclear. Some aspects of the visitor's role have been
spelled out. The visitor may exercise jurisdiction either as the
result of an appeal or on his or her own initiative. 22 The visitor must
observe the basic tenets of natural justice, and absent a breach of
those rules, the visitor's authority is exhaustive, final, and unreviewable by the courts. 23
In theory, the visitor seems to be a detached figure charged with
the neutral oversight of university decisions and policies. In recent
times, the role of the visitor has been largely irrelevant because the
appointed person cannot practically carry out the functions of the office. 24 The only significance of the visitor today is that, where the
office exists, the courts have declined jurisdiction to hear student

W. Ricquier, "The University Visitor" (1978) 4 Dal. L.J. 647 at 651-653.
J. W. Bridge, "Keeping Peace in the Universities: The Role of the Visitor"
(1970) 86 L.Q.R. 531; see also Ricquier, ibid.
19 Bridge, ibid. at 532.
20 Ibid. at 538.
21 Ricquier, supra note 17 at 677.
22 Bridge, supra note 18 at 536.
23 Ibid at 544.
2 4 Until the eighteenth century, the powers of the visitor were personally exercised .by the office-holder, but at least from the mid-nineteenth century it
appeared that the powers of the visitor could be delegated. Ricquier, supra note 17
at 678--679.
!7

!8
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appeals. 25 Some courts have expressed appreciation for the office,
commenting that recourse to internal appeals, including to the visitor, are more appropriate forums for students than the courts because
of economy, convenience, and speed of resolution. 26 At least two
scholars have looked at the office in a similar but cautiously optimistic manner, concluding that if the office can be brought into the
twentieth century intact, it may still be useful.27
The office of the visitor has long been abolished in all but a few
Canadian universities. 28 Those that retain the office would do well
to either follow suit and abolish it, or update the office so that it
becomes meaningful. One possible way to revive the role would be
to retain the office, but ensure that legally trained arbitrators, and
not ceremonial figures, are appointed to the office. There is some
precedent for this. Where no express nomination as to who would assume the visitorial office was made, it has been held that visitorial
powers are to be exercised in the Court of Chancery. 29
Unfortunately, neither abolition nor revival of the office of the visitor is likely in the foreseeable future; the office is statutorily created and any change must come from the provincial legislature.
II. NATURAL JUSTICE
IN THE UNIVERSITY CONTEXT

Students can become engaged in the appeals processes of a university through academic appeals, academic discipline and non-aca25

See Langloisv. Rector and Members ofLaval University (1973), 47 D.L.R. (3d)
674 (Que. C.A.); Prokopchuk v. University ofSaskatchewan et al (1985), 12 Admin
L.R. 123 (Sask. Q.B.); Blasserv. Royallnstitution for the Advancement ofLearning et
al. (1985), 16 Admin. L.R. 298 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter Blasser]; Wong v.
University of Toronto et al. (1989), 45 Admin. LR. 113 (Ont. Dist. Ct.)
[hereinafter Wong (1989)].
26 Blasser, ibid. at 310.
27 Bridge, supra note 18; Ricquier, supra note 17.
2 8 Dalhousie abolished the office in 1863 by repealing the statute that created
the office and substituting another which made no mention of a visitor.
However, at the University of Toronto, all powers not expressly delegated were
vested in the Board of Trustees, and this was held to include visitorial powers. See
Wong (1989), supra note 25. Three other universities that have retained the office
into the 1990's are Laval University, McGill University, and the University of
Saskatchewan.
29 Ricquier, supra note 17 at 651, commenting on the decision in The King v.
The Bishop ofEly (1788), 100 E.R. 157 (K.B.).
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demic discipline. Academic appeals concern, inter alia, course requirements, regulations, fitness requirements, and the reassessment
of grades. They are normally initiated by the student in response to
a grievance that has not been worked out (either formally or informally) at the departmental level. Appeals of these decisions normally go to faculty-level committees, and then on to a Senate
Committee, the decisions of which are voted on by the Senate as a
whole. 3°Further recourse is had either to the visitor or to the courts.
As a university is also charged with maintaining internal academic and non-academic discipline, it will have jurisdiction to
prosecute allegations of academic and non-academic offences. Nonacademic offences are often handled through the office of the
President, regardless of whether this power is explicitly delegated
or not. Academic offences, such as cheating and plagiarism, remain
within the jurisdiction of the Senate. Some universities provide for
several levels of appeal up to the Senate; others direct all such allegations to the Senate at first instance.3 1
As public bodies susceptible to judicial review, universities
must observe the requirements of natural justice when exercising
their regulatory powers.
The Availability of Prerogative Writs
The question of whether the writs of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition are available to students seeking judicial review of a university's decision(s) was answered in the affirmative by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Kingv. University of Saskatchewan.3 2 The Court
held that the three requirements for prerogative writs were met:
namely, that the body was statutorily created and authorized to act;
that its duties were in the nature of public duties; and, that the
duties were judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.33
Since then, it has never been doubted that judicial review of university decisions is available and the cases have turned on whether
the writs should in fact issue under the circumstances.

30 Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals" [unpublished].
3l Dalhousie's Senate is an example of a body that has not delegated such disciplinary powers.
32 (1969), 6 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter King},.
33 Ibid. at 125.
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Requirements of Natural Justice and the Standard of Review
The general rule as to whether, and to what extent, the rules of natural justice apply in any given case depend on "the circumstances of
the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal
is acting, the subject matter which is being dealt with, and so
forth."3 4 This idea has been restated as importing on tribunals a
general duty to act fairly depending on (a) the nature of the decision, (b) the relationship between the administrative body and the
individual and (c) the effect of the decision on the individual's
rights.35 All statutory bodies have a duty to act fairly. An implied
condition of the legislature's delegation of power is that the power
will be exercised in a fair manner.36
One would think that a high degree of natural justice or procedural fairness would apply to university academic and disciplinary
tribunals. The decisions of these tribunals are directed against students individually, unlike university regulations which have general
application. Tribunal decisions involve issues of competence, fitness, and punishment. The effect on the student of an adverse decision may be the deprivation of the career for which the student was
in training, and render useless any previous academic success in that
program. It may foreclose further university education entirely.
Yet the courts have shown extreme deference to universities in
their academic and disciplinary capacity. In Re Hare/kin and
University of Regina, Beetz, J. held that the legislature, by empowering the university Senate to hear appeals, indicated that "the courts
should be slow to intervene in university affairs by means of discretionary writs whenever it is still possible for the university to correct its errors."3 7 Somehow, Beetz, J.'s qualified statement has been
translated into something quite different. It would not be incorrect
to say that exhaustion of university level appeals is almost a precondition of judicial review. The courts have also consistently
34 Dickson, J. (as he then was) dissenting in Kane v. Board of Governors of the
University of British Columbia (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 311 at 322 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter Kane], quoting Tucker, L.J. in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk et. al.,
[1949] 1 All E.R. 109 at 118.
35 Hillv. University College of Cape Breton et al., (1991) 104 N.S.R. (2d) 285 at
290 (N.S.S.C. T.D.).
3G Re Polten and Governing Council of the University of Toronto et al. ( 197 5), 8
O.R. (2d) 749 at 759 [hereinafter Re Polten].
37 (1979), 96 D.L.R. (3d) 14 at 57 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Re Hare/kin].
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applied a very low standard of natural justice in their efforts to defer to university decisions.
The Ontario District Court based the rationale for deference on
entirely different reasons in Wong (1989), ten years after Re
Hare/kin. There it was held that the court's reluctance to interfere is
based on the special relationship of members of a university, the
importance of academic independence, and the special expertise of
university tribunals.38
Nevertheless, the courts have been willing to apply a high standard of justice to professors and officials of the university because
that "is required when the right to continue in one's profession or
employment is at stake." 39 So far, Healeyv. Memorial University of
Newfoundland is the only decision to apply this standard to a student.
Judicial review for violations of natural justice is normally confined to a review of procedure. It is clear that the courts will not
conduct a substantive review of the merits of a student's case: 40
[T]he standards for a degree, and the assessment of a student's work, are so clearly vested in a university that the
Courts have no power to intervene merely because it is
thought that the standards are too high, or that the stu dent's work was inaccurately assessed. 41

The court will only review the record when it finds there have been
"flagrant violations" 42 or "obvious denials" 43 of natural justice, or
where the procedures involved were "manifestly unfair" 44 or

38

Wong {1989), supra note 25 at 129.

39 Kane, supra note 34; Healeyv. Memorial University of Newfoundland (1992),

St. J. No.4305 (QL) (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) [hereinafter Healey].
40 Hague v. Senate of the University ofBritish Columbia (1988), 47 D.L.R. (4th)
150 (B.C.S.C.).
41 Re Polten, supra note 36 at 758, Weatherston, J. for the Court.
42 Paine v. University of Toronto et al. (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 770 at 776-777
(C.A.) [hereinafter Paine]; Bilson et al. v. University of Saskatchewan (1984), 9
Admin. LR. 196 at 223 (Sask. CA.).
43 Morgan v. Board of Governors ofAcadia University et al. (1985), 15 Admin.
LR. 61 at 83 (N.S.S.C. T.D.).
44 Bennettv. Wilfted Laurier University et al. (1983), 15 Admin. LR. 42 at 48
(Ont. Sup. Ct. (Div. Ct.)).
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"manifestly and flagrantly contrary" 45 to the principles of natural
justice.
Re Polten4 6 is authority for the proposition that a failure of
natural justice in a lower tribunal cannot be cured on appeal unless
the appeal is actually a trial de novo. In a de novo hearing the reviewing body does not exercise purely appellate functions but decides the matter afresh. Unless no procedures for a de novo hearing
exist, 47 the court will allow the university an opportunity to "correct
it's errors" 4S before undertaking any judicial review.
In one exceptional case, the court ruled that even a de novo hearing would not be sufficient because of bias. 49 This is a logical extension of the rule regarding failures of natural justice being "cured"
on appeal; if the appellate body is not capable of granting a de novo
hearing in accordance with natural justice, it is no appeal at all.
Only one case reviewed the merits of a tribunal's decision based
on the "patently unreasonable" standard and the decision in question
was a procedural one: to maintain disciplinary jurisdiction over a
student after the professor who lodged a complaint had withdrawn
it.5° In that case a writ of prohibition issued to prevent the discipline committee from considering the matter further.
In sum, the courts will only exercise judicial review over university tribunals and bodies where:
(a) all internal levels of appeal are exhausted, or the university is unable to conduct a de novo hearing in accordance with natural justice, and
(b) any decisions already made were undertaken after a
dear or flagrant violation of natural justice, or
(c) the decision reached by the tribunal, while within its
jurisdiction, was patently unreasonable.

This paper will now turn to an examination of the substantive
aspects of natural justice.
45

Archerv. Universite de Moncton (1992), 9 Admin. L.R. (2d) 200 at 201

(N.B.S.C.).
46

Supra note 36 at 767-768. See also Re Hare/kin, supra note 37 at 27-29.
Re Polten, supra note 36; Re Harelkin, supra note 37; Paine, supra note 42.
48 Re Harelkin, supra note 37 at 57.
49 Healey, supra note 39; see also Sharma v. University of Calgary (1990), 71
D.L.R. (4th) 344 (Alta. Q.B.).
so Aylwardv. McMaster University (1991), 47 Admin. L.R. 198 at 205-206
(Ont. Gen. Div.).
47
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Audi Alteram Partem: The Opportunity to be Heard
The audi alteram partem rule is often cited as shorthand for the requirement that a person be heard, but inherent in this are several
other rights attendant on a hearing. These other rights may or may
not be required in any given case. Loosely, they are the rights to notice, disclosure, a hearing, counsel, cross-examination, and reasons
for the decision. The requirements that natural justice imposes on
university tribunals and decision-makers regarding each of these areas will be examined in turn.

i. Notice
Notice is one of the preconditions to the audi alteram partem rule in
the sense that without notice, a party is unable to exercise any other
procedural guarantees. While notice has never been the main issue in
a student's appeal to the courts, the courts have consistently determined that university appeals and disciplinary decisions affect the
rights of students in such a manner that notice is required.5 1
Despite this, few universities even state how notice is to be effected. Some dispense with notice entirely by permitting a Dean to
exercise discretion to ban a "dangerous" student from the campus.52
Many universities specify that notice of proceedings against a
student will' be mailed to the student's last known address, but that
the university will maintain jurisdiction and deal with a student in
absentia if no reply is made within a given time.53 The most
comprehensive provisions regarding notice are found in the
University of Alberta Calendar, which requires that notices be sent
by double-registered mail or hand-delivered.5 4 Unfortunately, this
rule only applies to communication of a penalty, and not to the initiation of proceedings.

5! See e.g. Re Harelkin, supra note 37; Hill v. University College of Cape Breton
et al., supra note 35.
52 See e.g. University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University ofAlberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.12 at

59.
53 See e.g. Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations
(Undergraduates)," Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg.
W,at65.
54 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.5 at
56.
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ii. Disclosure
Disclosure of a university's case against a student is necessary in order for the student to be able to reply to it effectively, yet the requirement of disclosure has been somewhat watered down by the
courts in university situations. Bennettv. Wi(fred Laurier University
et af.55 set the minimum threshold at disclosure of "the substance of
the allegations in sufficient detail to enable [a person] to respond."
The court went on to note that this did not necessarily involve a
right to hear the actual evidence, cross-examine the witnesses, or
even have the names of the witnesses.
Courts have held that a committee may not act on an ex parte
basis by holding private interviews with witnesses, or hear evidence
in the absence of a party.56 It is not dear whether later disclosure of
this evidence by the committee will cure a violation. In Kane,
Dickson, J. (as he then was) seemed to think that there would be no
violation of natural justice where the committee allowed the parties
to respond to the new evidence.57
Archer v. Universite de Moncton5 8 dealt with the timing of disclosure. In that case the student was given an unfavourable report for
the first time at the hearing. The court held that, as long as the student was given time to read the report and did not request an adjournment, natural justice had been observed.
At minimum then, a university must disclose the substance of
any allegation against a student which a person or committee plans
to use in coming to a decision, although the disclosure need not take
place until the hearing itself.
The universities have taken several different positions on disclosure. At Memorial University, a student charged with an academic
offence is informed in writing of the "nature of the case," but an opportunity to respond directly to his or her accusers is not guaranteed.59 In contrast, at Dalhousie University, provision exists for the
Senate Academic Appeals Committee to require the disclosure of

55 Supra note 44 at 47.
Kane, supra note 34 at 322.
Ibid. at 323, citing R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Com 'r, Ex.p. Jones, [1962] 2
Q.B. 677 at 686.
58 Supra note 45.
59 Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations (Undergraduates),"
Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 4 at 67.
56
5?
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documents necessary for an appeal.Go The University of British
Columbia places an onus to disclose on the student; all medical or
emotional problems must be reported to the Dean of the relevant
Faculty. Untimely notification will be taken into account when deciding a student's appeal.GI This regulation seems particularly and
needlessly intrusive into the private aspects of a student's life.

iii. Right to a Hearing
In Re Po/ten it was decided that natural justice in universities does
"not always require a formal hearing, or the presence of the appellant, provided his [sic] case is presented ... by way of correspondence, briefs, memoranda or otherwise. "G2 Other aspects of natural
justice may presuppose that the student is present at the hearing; if
his or her presence is required to make a proper response, if it is a
situation in which counsel is permitted, or if a credibility issue requires that a right of cross-examination be given. Certainly, by the
time an appeal reaches Senate level, the presence of the appellant is
a requirement of natural justice.G3
In terms of the right to a hearing, most universities permit the
parties to be heard in writing at lower levels and in person at a
Senate hearing.G 4 Variations do, however, exist. The University of
Alberta and University of British Columbia permit a student to be
present at all levels in discipline cases.G5

GO Dalhousie University (1988), "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," Rule 4(iv)(c), [unpublished].
GI University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations,"
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30.
G2 Re Po/ten, supra note 36 at 768.
G3 Healey, supra note 39. The trial judge held that Healey should have had the
right to be present and commented: "I have not been shown another case where the
allegations have been as serious, and the protections afforded as few, as in the present case." See also the various university Calendars, many of which set out a right
to be present at hearings.
G4 See e.g. Saint Mary's University, "Academic Regulations," Saint Mary's
University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 11 at 23; University of
Western Ontario, "Academic Policies and Regulations," University of Western
Ontario 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30.
G5 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.8 at
58; University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations,"
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 34.
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Memorial University specifically provides that in the most serious discipline cases, an accused will have no opportunity to confront his or her accusers. The student is not permitted to be present
at his or her own hearing, and the case for both sides is presented by
the Chair of the Senate Undergraduate Committee. 66 A student at
Saint Mary's University is permitted to be present at his or her discipline hearing, but is presumed guilty until proven innocent where
the alleged offence pertains to an examination.67 At York
University, just the opposite occurs: a student charged with an academic offence "shall be presumed innocent until guilt, based upon
clear and compelling evidence, has been determined by the committee. "68
iv. Right to Counsel

In determining whether a student has a right to appear before a tribunal with counsel, the courts have distinguished between Senate and
lower level hearings. At lower level hearings, it is not uncommon
for a student to be permitted a non-lawyer advocate, however, there
is no indication that this is a right. At Senate (or highest-level) hearings, students are generally permitted legal counsel. 69 In rare instances, counsel is permitted at all levels.7°
v. Right to Cross-Examine Witnesses

It is generally accepted that there is no right to cross-examine witnesses unless the credibility of the witness is an issue at the hearing.7 1
66 Memorial University, "General Academic Regulations (Undergraduates),"
Memorial University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 4 at 67.
67 Saint Mary's University, "Academic Regulations," Saint Mary's University
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 19(c) at 24.
68 York University, "University Policies and Regulations," York University
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, at 360.
69 Healey, supra note 39; Miraliakbari v. Dalhousie College and University,
supra note 15. See also University of Western Ontario, "Academic Policies and
Regulations," University of Western Ontario 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at
30; University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations,"
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar, at 29.
70 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University ofAlberta 1993-1994 Undergraduate Calendar, Reg. 26.8 at
57-58.
7I Hajeev. York University (1985), 11 0.A.C 72 (Div. Ct.); Y.B. v. R. W. et al
(1985), 16 Admin. LR. 99 (Ont. H.C.J.).
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This cross-examination must be direct (ie. not through the
committee) if the witness appears in person.72 Any right of crossexamination appears to be negatived if the witness does not appear
personally. The committee is still entitled to consider the evidence
without cross-examination as there is no power of subpoena in university tribunals, 73 and such tribunals are not required to adhere to
strict rules of evidence.
Cross-examination is seldom mentioned in university
Calendars; when it is mentioned, it is usually to qualify it as a limited right. York University permits cross-examination where a factual dispute exists; 74 Dalhousie University Senate hearings allow
cross-examination, but give the Committee the option to require
that it be undertaken indirectly, that is, through the Committee.75

vi. The Right to Reasons
There is no mention in the caselaw of a right to reasons for a university tribunal's decision. A comment by Dickson, J. (as he then was)
dissenting in Re Harelkin76 could be inferred as connecting a right to
reasons with a right to appeal. Dickson, J. asked: "Should Mr.
Harelkin be expected to [appeal] to the Senate not knowing ... the
real reason for his expulsion?" This statement was given in the context of a student who did not receive a hearing, but it is arguably
just as valid where an appealable decision was given without reasons.

72

Hajeev. York University, ibid.; Healey, supra note 39.

73 Re Mcinnes and Simon Fraser University et al. (1984), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 708
(B.C.C.A).
7 4 York University, "University Policies and Regulations," York University
1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 356.
75 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," Reg. 9(a) at iv [unpublished].
76 Supra note 37 at 31.
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Nemo judex in Causa Sua: Bias
The nemo judex rule is the second major requirement of natural justice, but the courts have put a very high threshold on it in the university cases. The case of Re Schabas et al. and Caput of the University
of Toronto et al.7 7 held that where the composition of a body is
statutorily determined, only a showing of actual bias (as opposed to
a reasonable apprehension of bias) will suffice. The court found that
proof that the committee members had heard of the incident in
question at an earlier meeting did not amount to bias. Bilson et al. v.
University of Saskatchewan78 confirmed that a lesser standard of
fairness is to be placed on domestic tribunals, and held that a
committee's consultation (during the hearing) with the lawyer for
the university did not produce bias. In order to avoid bias or the
appearance thereof, several universities have conflict of interest regulations pertaining to who may sit on a committee considering an
academic appeal or a discipline case.7 9 Dalhousie University has
adopted a general rule that no person from the same faculty as the
appellant may sit on a Senate committee. 80 The University of
British Columbia goes a step further and prohibits any ex parte
communication between committee members and parties to the
dispute. 81 The University of Alberta forbids disclosure of a student's prior discipline record until the guilt or innocence of the student has been determined. Such a record is only relevant with regard to penalty. s2
This high threshold regarding bias seems to have arisen out of a
recognition of the "community" nature of a university; universities
are close communities with a limited number of officials and fac(1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 495 (Ont. H.C.).
Supra note 42.
79 See e.g. University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University of Alberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 57;
University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations," University of
British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 30; York University,
"University Policies and Regulations," York University 1993-94 Undergraduate
Calendar at 358.
80 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," at ii [unpublished].
81 University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations,"
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar Reg. 2.06 at 29.
82 University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University ofAlberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 57.
77
78
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ulty who are qualified to hear appeals. In King, 83 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that university tribunals may permissibly have an
overlap or duplication of membership at various levels of appeal.
Paine 84 held that a tenure committee (but not a tribunal) may act
based on personal knowledge of the appellant, as well as the
material actually placed before it.
The Paine case illustrates that the high threshold of bias in university cases is problematic. In some of the smaller departments
and Faculties of a university, it would be difficult to find a faculty
member who did not know the student appellant personally and did
not have prior knowledge of the facts surrounding the appeal. A
recognition of this, while pragmatic, seems to sacrifice procedural
fairness on the altar of efficacy. How can a student know whether the
members of a tribunal are acting solely on the material before
them? How can a student know the case he or she has to meet if some
of the material the committee members use in their decision-making is only in their minds and never disclosed to the student? This
strikes at the heart of both fundamental principles of natural justice;
audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. As such, the high
threshold imposed since King ought to be reconsidered by the
courts.
Healef 5 gives some indication that the high threshold of proving bias is in fact under reconsideration. It is the only case in which
bias was inferred from other evidence. In Healey, the court held that
since the entire Senate had received transcripts of a previous tainted
proceeding, a fair rehearing was impossible at that level, even if
conducted as a de novo trial. As a result, the court intervened and
ordered that Healey be reinstated as a student.
Remedies

If certiorari is granted by the court, it may quash the decision of the
inferior tribunal. Normally the case will then be sent back to a differently constituted tribunal for a re-hearing in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. 86 If such a hearing is pending or is no
longer possible, an interim or perpetual injunction may require the
Supra note 32.
Supra note 42.
85 Supra note 39.
86 Hajee v. York University, supra note 71; Hill v. University College of Cape
Breton et al., supra note 35.
83
84
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university to re-admit a student. 87 A writ of mandamus may issue to
compel a university to grant a degree, or a writ of prohibition to
prevent it from acting. 88 Other remedies, such as specific performance and damages, are available if the action is framed in contract
or tort. They are discussed in a later section.

Conclusion: Judicial Deference to Universities
Although Healey provides some hope that the courts may begin to
require a higher level of natural justice in universities, caselaw suggests a general reluctance on the part of the courts to intervene in the
academic affairs of universities, particularly with respect to alleged
failures of natural justice.
Universities have implemented many procedural guarantees that
could arguably justify the deference of the courts, but a review of
the regulations of ten sample universities indicates several areas
where universities have not adequately protected the interests of
their students. 89 Among them:
"
•
"
•
"

widespread variance among written policies;
guidelines that are extremely vague on procedural
rights;
an unparalleled amount of unreviewable discretion at
departmental and faculty levels;
little or no attention to the requirements of natural
justice set out by caselaw;
reservation of enormous discretion to dismiss students for academic or non-academic reasons.

The majority of the aforementioned regulations pertain to
Senate level appeals: the tip of the administrative iceberg. Most
faculties and departments are free to determine their own procedures. This has resulted in a daunting maze of internal regulations
with even more variety than is present among the universities. 90 Of
the universities surveyed, not one had developed uniform procedures
for lower-level appeals.
The lack of uniform procedures becomes important when tied
to the fact that not a single university surveyed offers a true de novo
87 Boon v. Newbound and Governors of the University ofAlberta (1983), 29 Alta.
LR. (2d) 131 (Q.B.); Healey, supra note 39.
88 King, supra note 32; Aylward, supra note 50.
89 Supra note 3.
90 Dalhousie University provides an example.
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hearing at Senate level, unless it is the hearing at first instance.9 1
Each set of university regulations contains a privative clause of varying scope. For example:
0

•

"

0

Queen's University permits appeals on "other than
academic grounds";92
The University of British Columbia regulations state
that the Senate Committee "has no jurisdiction where
the sole question raised in the appeal turns on the exercise of academic judgment by a Faculty";93
Dalhousie University's Senate committee may not
hear appeals involving "a requested exemption from
the application of faculty or university regulations or
procedures, except when irregularities or unfairness in
the application thereof is alleged."94 The procedures
also specifically state that the Senate committee
may not second-guess a Faculty with regard to either
grade assessments or fitness for a profession; the
remedy for an appeal of this sort is, at most, a reassessment or reconsideration by the Faculty respectively;
The University of Alberta permits academic appeals
to the Senate only where there has been a "miscarriage
of justice," but the committee is not authorized to
hear any appeal respecting a grade in an individual
course, an admissions decision, or a decision relating
to transfer credits. Discipline appeals are conducted
as de novo hearings, but are only permitted where
they pertain to a denial of the offence, or to the
penalty. Procedural irregularities will not be sufficient to quash a decision unless it deprives either
party of a fair hearing.95

9I For example, Dalhousie University has vested all jurisdiction over academic
discipline in the Senate. See Dalhousie University, "University Regulations,"
Dalhousie University 1993-94 Dentistry, Law, and Medicine Calendar at 33.
92 Queen's University, "Code of Conduct and Academic Regulations," Queens
University 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 361.
93 University of British Columbia, "General Academic Regulations,"
University of British Columbia 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 29.
94 Dalhousie University, (1988) "Senate Academic Appeals Committee
Procedures for the Conduct of Appeals," at i [unpublished].
95 · University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students," University ofAlberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar at 49, 57-58.
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Most exclude all appeals except those based on a denial of procedural fairness at lower levels. An appeal on the merits of the case is
impossible, particularly with regard to academic judgments.
The deference that has been accorded university decisionmakers by the courts is based in part on the university being able to
"correct its own errors" through de novo hearings. As Dickson, J.
pointed out in his dissent in Re Harelkin, "the normal sort of purely
appellate function will rarely be seen as capable of curing a breach
of natural justice." 96 Instead, a student appears before the Senate of
his or her respective institution with the onus of showing that natural
justice has been denied at the Faculty level. The substantive merits
of that decision are unquestionable, and an adverse decision at the
lower level weighs on the student like a stone. Many years of education and a potential lifetime in a career often hang in the balance. If
the student is successful, the most he or she can normally hope for is
that the Senate will direct an already certain Faculty to reconsider
the case.
In defence of universities, it might be said that they have shied
away from undue formalism, preferring instead to resolve disputes
quickly, flexibly, inexpensively, and informally. One must recognize, however, that excessive informalism might not be appropriate
where important interests are at stake. Universities have a virtual
monopoly over entrance to all of Canada's professions and most of
the higher education in Canada; an adverse decision at one university
can virtually preclude further education there or elsewhere. Given
that the courts defer almost completely to university autonomy, the
procedural guarantees offered by the universities surveyed do not go
far enough; in some cases, they directly contradict what minimal
guarantees the courts have required.

96

Supra note 37 at 29.

126

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
III. LIABILITY OF UNIVERSITIES IN
CONTRACT AND TORT

When G. H. L. Fridman made his innocuous remark about universities and students entering into contractual relationships, he may well
have set off a spate of cases in which students sued a university for
breach of contract.9 7 Although it was not a contracts case, the first
Canadian case characterizing the student-university relationship as a
contractual one was Re Polten. 98 The court cited the Fridman article
and stated that although the procedural rules of a faculty or school
have no statutory basis, the student must be taken to have agreed to
be bound by them upon entering the faculty or school.99
In construing the terms of the contract between the student and
the university, the Ontario Court of Appeal refused to imply a term
that a specific thesis supervisor would be provided. 100 It found that
such a term was not required to give the contract efficacy. The
Ontario Divisional Court in Ryan v. University of Ottawa 10 1 ruled
that the university did not breach its contract by failing to permit a
student who was facing disciplinary charges to withdraw from the
university as allowed by the regulations.
In Doane v. Mount St. Vincent University et al. 102 the court accepted that an action in specific performance could lie against a
university in order to compel it to award a diploma or degree, but
held that the plaintiff had not shown her compliance with the terms
of the contract by passing the course in question. 103 Similarly, in
Chicoine v. Ryerson Polytechnical Institute104 the court accepted that
97 Fridman, supra note 4 at 181. It is probably best to view the publication of a
Calendar as an invitation to treat and the application of a student as an offer
which the university may accept. This was the construction taken by the court in
Pecoverv. Bowker (1957), 8 D.L.R. (2d) 20 (Alta. S.C.) in which a student sought
mandamus to enforce his "right" to be admitted to law school, having satisfied
the minimum requirements for admission.
98 Supra note 36.
99 Ibid. at 754.
JOO Wong v. Governing Council of the University of Toronto et al. (1992), 4
Admin. LR. (2d) 95 (Ont. CA.).
101 (1989), 35 OA.C. 290 (Ont. Div.Ct.).
102 (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 297 (N.S.S.C. T.D.).
103 The Doane case turned on the construction of the course syllabus and
whether both terms of work had to be passed individually, or whether an overall
passing grade was acceptable. Ibid. at 302-303.
104 (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 261 (Ont. Prov. Ct. Sm. Cl. Div.).
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it had jurisdiction to hear a case framed as breach of contract
because of the Institute's failure to teach a course as set out in the
Calendar. The Court specifically rejected an analogy to labour relations cases which curb the jurisdiction of the courts where a statutory framework provides for the final settlement of all differences
between the parties. No such framework exists in university statutes,
and furthermore, it was the Academic Council under the university
appeals process that did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate or grant
damages for such a claim.105
The first successful breach of contract action by a student against
a Canadian university came in McBeth v. Governors of Dalhousie
College and University. 106 McBeth, a law student, sought damages
from the university because it did not allow her to write a supplemental exam until two years after the academic year in question had
ended. A civil jury awarded her $4647.75 for student loan interest,
legal fees and loss of business (non-legal), as well as $1688 in general damages. While the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court did not consider this a proper contracts case in
which to award damages for mental distress and overturned the
award of general damages, the Court did accept that the terms of
the University Calendar formed the basis of the contract between
the parties.
The most recent breach of contract case between a student and a
university was the 1992 case of Bellv. St. Thomas University. 107 In
Bell, a social work student was given permission to repeat a failed
field instruction course upon fulfilling certain conditions, despite
the fact that the Calendar provided students with the opportunity to
repeat courses "without special permission." When he was later
deemed to have failed again for not meeting the conditions imposed, he brought an action for damages in both tort and contract.
The Court held that the university had breached its contract
with Bell, as set out in the University Calendar. However, the plaintiff failed in his action because he had not shown any damages and
had not asked for an order compelling the defendant to readmit
him to the course without conditions. While this case confirms that
an order for specific performance is available to compel a univer105

Ibid. at 263-264. There is no indication in the reports as to whether the
plaintiff was successful at trial.
106 (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 321 (N.S.S.C. A.D.).
107 (1992), 97 D.L.R. (4th) 370 (N.B.Q.B.).
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sity to adhere to the Calendar or to re-enrol a student, it is more
important for its statement on the availability of damages in such
situations.
Here, Bell had claimed tuition expenses for the social work
courses already undertaken, as well as loss of income calculated
over twenty years. The court rejected both heads of damage. It did
not allow the tuition expenses for three years of the social work program because the plaintiff had returned to the university and used
the credits earned toward a Bachelor of Arts degree and therefore
had not suffered any loss. An important issue with regard to damages remains open-whether the "value" of a university credit is obtained upon successful completion of the course, or whether the value
depends on putting the credit to some other use, such as transfer
credits or the acquisition of a degree. It is certainly arguable that
the whole of a university degree is of greater value than the sum of
its parts.
The court also refused to allow damages for Bell's lost wages.
First, the amount had not been proven. From the decision it seems
as if the amount claimed was rather arbitrary, so this ruling is not
surprising. Second, the court held that since the plaintiff may have
failed the course again, the damages for lost income were too remote. This analysis leaves another question open in that it may be
possible for a student to claim lost wages where the amount is carefully documented (perhaps as before and after degree figures) and
the plaintiff can show every likelihood of successfully completing
the degree (such as where the student is expelled for a reason not
pertaining to low grades).
In the educational context, very few tort actions have been
commenced against universities by students. The Wong (1989)108
case concluded without analysis that there was no tort of educational
malpractice. 109 The action in Bell v. St. Thomas University 1 io was
framed in negligent misrepresentation as well as breach of contract.
With regard to the tort claim, the court applied Hedley Byrne111 but
Supra note 25.
Wong (1989), supra note 25 at 118-119. The court merely cited the case of
Hicksv. Etobicoke (City) Board of Education, [1988] O.J. No.1900 (QL), which
involved a public school.
110 Supra note 107.
111 Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 575
(H.L.).
!OS
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found that the defendant's mid-term statement that they would
"consider" allowing the plaintiff to retake the course was neither
negligent nor relied on by the plaintiff.
From these few cases it is possible to conclude that a university
is liable to its students for breach of contract where it fails to abide
by the regulations set out in the Calendar and other official documents.112 While problems exist with regard to the proof of damages, the courts do seem willing to enforce the contract through equitable remedies such as an injunction or specific performance. 11 3
Given that the deference accorded universities in judicial review
does not exist in contracts cases, an action for breach of contract
would seem to be a promising area for students aggrieved by a university's failure to abide by its own regulations.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER AND
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION TO UNIVERSITIES

The curious public/private duality in the status of universities poses
such a unique problem that the Supreme Court of Canada finally
had to rule on whether the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms114 and the various provincial human rights legislation even
applied to them. 11 5 In McKinney v. University of Guelph, 11 6 a
mandatory retirement case, Justices Laforest, Dickson and Gonthier
held that the Charter applies only to "government action." Despite
112 Such a contract would be more akin to an contract d'adhesion or a standard
form contract than one freely negotiated between the parties. As such, any clause
purporting to limit a university's liability to students would be interpreted
strictly.
11 3 Lewis made the point that a court might be more reluctant to grant this type
of remedy despite the inadequacy of damages where to do so would "force the
parties to maintain a personal relationship," supra note 1 at 259. However, in the
few cases that do consider equitable relief for students, the courts do not seem concerned with any similarities a university-student contract might have with
contracts for personal services.
114 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
l15 The cases were McKinney, supra note 5, and University ofBritish Columbia v.
Berg (1993), 102 D.L.R. (4th) 665 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Berg]. Two earlier cases
simply assumed that the Charter applied to universities: Morgan v. Board of
Governors ofAcadia University et al., supra note 43, and Wong (1989), supra note

25.

116

Supra note 5.
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close ties with government in terms of creation, regulation and
funding, the long history of autonomy within universities meant that
they were not "government actors" for purposes of the Charter. 1 17
Cases involving human rights legislation have focussed on the
question of whether universities are in the business of providing services "customarily available to the public." 118 In Beattie et al. v.
Governors ofAcadia University et al, 119 American students protested
their exclusion from a varsity team because of a rule imposing
quotas on foreign-trained basketball players. MacKeigan, C.J .N .S.
declined to expand the application of the Nova Scotia Human Rights
Act120 on the grounds that university services were available to only a
subset of the public (in this case, those who had satisfied the
admission requirements), and not to the public generally.
[The Nova Scotia Human Rights Act] does not ... cover
all types of discrimination or cover all places in which
banned types of discrimination might occur .... It
would be the unthinkable that any university ... would
knowingly discriminate .... The fact remains, however,
that such laudable conduct by the university is voluntary.121

11 7

McKinney, supra note 5 at 320-443. Justices Wilson and L'Hereux-Dube
dissented. Both would have found that universities are government actors and that
the Charter applies in the same way that it applies to community colleges. The
majority did not entirely close this door, leaving the possibility that some aspects
a university's work may meet the "control test," thus subjecting that aspect of the
university's operation to Charter scrutiny. While it seems that an argument could
be made that the "university as employer" is different from the "university as
educator," Lamer, C.J.C. did not mention this distinction in Berg, supra note 115
at 685, and merely concluded on the basis of McKinney that the Charter did not
apply to universities.
118 Berg, supra note 115 at 678-679. The current Nova Scotia Human Rights
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214, s. 4, uses the phrase "available to other individuals or
classes of individuals in society." The Federal Act, and the Acts of seven provinces
contain some reference to public availability of, or access to, services. The Acts of
Manitoba and Nova Scotia refer to subsets of the public, and the Ontario Act contains no limiting phrase at all.
ll9 (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 718 (N.S.S.C. A.O.).
120 Nova Scotia Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11.
121 Beattie et aL v. Governors ofAcadia University et al., supra note 119 at 723724.
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The Supreme Court of Canada addressed this matter in May of
1993, in University of British Columbia v. Berg. 122 Berg, a graduate
student with a history of depression, was denied two services customarily available to graduate students in her department: a key to
the building for after-hours access, and a rating sheet (like a reference) to enable her to obtain a field placement. The Supreme Court
held that the British Columbia Human Rights Act 12 3 did apply to
the University of British Columbia.
The reasoning of the Court seems to be based on three grounds.
First, Lamer, C.J .C. (for the majority) commented that since the
Charter does not apply to universities 124 and a common law right of
action for discrimination has been foreclosed by human rights
legislation, 12 5 students would be left with no remedy for discrimination if human rights acts did not apply.
Second, all parties agreed that admissions applications were
available to the general public, and thus the Act applied to those
initial procedures; it was the application of the Act to the internal
workings of the university that was in question. Lamer, C.J.C. rejected this distinction entirely, arguing that the legislature could
not have intended it:
I would reject any definition of "public" which refuses to
recognize that any accommodation, service or facility
will only ever be available to a subset of the public ....
Students admitted to a university ... become the
"public" for that service. Every service has its own public,
and once that "public" has been defined through the use of
eligibility criteria, the Act prohibits discrimination
within that public .... 126
[To maintain such a distinction] would allow such institutions to frustrate the purpose of the legislation by
admitting students without discrimination and then
denying them access to the accommodations, services and
facilities they require to make their admission meaningful. 127
122

Supra note 115.
Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, as. amended.
124 Mckinney, supra note 5.
125 Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v.
Bhadauria(l981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
126 Berg, supra note 115 at 686.
127 Ibid. at 685.
123
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"Public" was defined by the Court as "all persons legally or properly qualified." 128
Third, the words "customarily available" were examined as the
university maintained that it had a discretion as to whether to issue
items such as keys and rating sheets to students. The Court accepted
the university's discretion but stated that where the discretion is habitually exercised in a certain way, it will not avail the university to
argue that it may deny a service simply because the discretion exists, particularly where that denial is based on a prohibited ground
of discrimination.129
The scope of this ruling was qualified somewhat by the obiter
statement that just because some activities of a service or facility
provider are subject to scrutiny does not mean that all are. The
Court recommended a "relational" approach to determining
whether the particular services of a provider are subject to the human
rights legislation. The relational approach looks to the relationship
between the service or facilities provider and the user of those services or facilities; the "public" is that group with which the offerer
has a public relationship.130
What the Court was probably making room for in its assertion
that the Act did not apply to all university activities was program
"fitness" requirements; that is, the regulatory power of a faculty or
department to expel an otherwise acceptable student on the grounds
that the student is unfit for the profession for which he or she is training. It was important to preserve this route at the time of the case
because the British Columbia Human Rights Act13 1 did not then
contain a defence to an allegation of discrimination in the form of a
"bona fide or reasonable justification" clause.
It is precisely in this area that the human rights acts of the
provinces ought to have full application. The similar wording of
other human rights legislation and similar structure of universities
across Canada leads one to believe that this case will have general
application to universities. The impact of excluding the protection
of human rights legislation from this area of university decisionmaking could be considerable.

128 Ibid. at 687.
129 Ibid. at 690-691.
130 Ibid. at 687-688.
13 1

Human Rights Act, S.B.C. 1984, c. 22, as amended.
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The power of a department or faculty to expel an otherwise
academically and clinically competent student based on a lack of
"fitness" for the profession for which she or he is training is a very
powerful discretion. Given past stereotypes of disadvantaged persons, particularly persons with disabilities, this power could be exercised based on professional stereotypes or through ignorance of the
true capabilities of such persons. This would deny disadvantaged
persons the opportunity to even attempt to become a member of a
profession. It is accepted that the discretion to declare a person unfit for a profession must exist somewhere, but given the enormous
deference courts have granted to universities in their assessment of
the merit of students, the discretion ought to be exercised after
graduation by the relevant licensing body for the profession which
the student seeks to enter.132
V. CONCLUSION:
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

In Kane, Dickson, J. pointed out that "[a] high standard of justice is
required when the right to continue in one's profession or employment is at stake." 133 This rule is often cited in cases between a
professor and a university; Healey is the only case to apply the rule
to a student. 134 One of the reasons that neither the universities nor the
courts have been protective of the interests of students is that, unlike
professors, students are not perceived as having any vested right to
continue or to complete their educations. As such, the requirements
of natural justice are seen to be closer to those which pertain to the
deprivation of as yet unvested rights, or mere privileges, as opposed
to the deprivation of employment or a profession.
Perhaps this view of students' interests is correct where their
continued presence in a program is not at stake, such as with a grade
appeal or a minor disciplinary matter. Where the expulsion of a
132

Another reason that estimations of "fitness" are better vested with licensing
bodies than universities is that degrees are providing increasing professional
flexibility. It is no longer unusual for a student to obtain a degree or enter a
profession with no intent of ever practicing. One example is a person who seeks
an LLB. for use in business as opposed to the practice of!aw.
l33 Supra note 34. Dickson, J., as he then was, was quoting the rule in Abbottv.
Sullivan and others, [1952] 1 K.B. 189 at 198.
134 Supra note 39.

134

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

student is a possible outcome, this view of the worth of an education
is now outdated and patently incorrect.
An undergraduate degree is now almost a precondition to many
forms of employment. Given the highly competitive nature of university programs, a student who has once been removed from a program will be unlikely to get another chance elsewhere. In some
cases, as where a permanent notation appears on a student's transcript
indicating that he or she has been found guilty of academic dishonesty, the student's transcript becomes less than worthless. It brands
the student with a mark of dishonesty for which there is no pardon.
The consequences to a student who has been expelled from a university can be severe, particularly where the student was studying for
a professional designation. To treat that student as having an interest
which vests upon graduation from a program rather than admission
is to lower the standard of procedural fairness in a situation where
the stakes are obviously high. This is not to say that students should
never be expelled, just that a high degree of procedural justice
should be required where foreclosure of an education is a possibility.
The court is the proper forum to monitor and ultimately decide
what natural justice requires of universities in their dealings with
students. It must be possible for the courts to defer to the unique
expertise of universities in the evaluation of students, to respect the
precious autonomy of these institutions, and at the same time insist
that universities accord a level of natural justice commensurate with
what is actually at stake for the student. Universities have great expertise with regard to education, but very little in the area of natural
justice. No deference should be shown to a university's interpretation of what natural justice requires.
Change should begin with the universities. Regulations and procedures should be revamped to grant students the same level of natural justice accorded to a person who may be deprived of his or her
employment or profession. At the very least, current procedures
must be brought into line with what the courts have hitherto required. However, this alone is not sufficient. Change in university
procedures should include:
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the redrafting of regulations to approximate a
"complete code" of academic and non-academic offences.135
provision for true de novo hearings at the Senate
level. It is not enough for the Senate to send a student's case back to a faculty that has already denied
the student a hearing in accordance with natural
justice. If such a denial is found, the Senate should be
vested with jurisdiction to strike a committee at that
level, which will hear the matter afresh, on its merits.
closer monitoring of individual faculties and departments within a university under newly drafted
unifor.m codes of procedure. Natural justice requirements should differentiate between actions
which may foreclose a student's education, and those
that would not do so. The latter may be left with individual faculties; the former should be the subject of
uniform regulations to ensure consistency.
procedures for obtaining an independent assessment of a student's academic or clinical merit.
While a faculty member or members who work with
a student on a daily· basis may be most qualified to
judge that student's competence, personal relation ships also develop over time. These relationships
could allow otherwise irrelevant considerations to
taint a faculty member's ability to judge a student.
strict conflict of interest guidelines and a bar on ex
parte communication at all levels. The current system is open to the perception of a monolithic university against a single student. Assurances are required
that the persons appointed to hear internal university
appeals have no interest in the outcome of the case,
risk no professional consequences for deciding in a
student's favour, and are completely indifferent as
between the student and her faculty.
estimations of professional "fitness" independent
of academic and clinical competence should be removed from the purview of universities and vested
with the relevant licensing body for the profession.
Fitness requirements are unusual in unlicensed disci-

l35 The University of Alberta has come quite close to producing such a code.
See the University of Alberta, "University Regulations and Information for
Students" University ofAlberta 1993-94 Undergraduate Calendar.
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plines. Where no licensing body exists, regulation
should be left to either the general laws of the land
through the legislative and law enforcement branches
of government, or to market forces.
Discretion to pardon or reinstate a student should
be vested in the Senate of each University.
Particularly with regard to "convictions" for academic and non-academic offences, procedures should
always include some measure of reversibility.

To revamp the current system of university tribunals and procedures will require a delicate balancing act on the part of the universities, the courts and possibly the legislatures. Direction can be
taken from employment law and from the careful balance already
achieved between the government, the courts, and the self-regulating
professions. As judges so often remind us, where justice requires it,
we should not avoid an action just because it is difficult or complicated to carry out. 13 6 In relation to Canada's universities, some
reconsideration is long overdue.
For now, a student aggrieved by a university's decision is best
advised to seek redress in either the law of contract or through human rights legislation. Judicial review by the courts is a poor and
ineffective guarantor of procedural justice in the university context.
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This statement is normally made in the context of assessing damages in
personal injury cases and determining custody matters in family law.

